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  For over 100 years, the Clayton Act has ostensibly prohibited 
anticompetitive mergers and acquisitions. Yet, as fears of market 
concentration and market power grow, it seems high time for a boost 
in enforcement. Armed with statutory causes of action for injunctive 
relief and treble damages, private plaintiffs could provide that needed 
boost. However, these plaintiffs face an unexpected hurdle to enforcing 
the merger laws: section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
  This Note argues that the narrowing of liability under section 2 over 
the past three decades has had a collateral impact on private 
plaintiffs’—especially rival firms’—ability to satisfy the antitrust injury 
requirement to challenge an anticompetitive merger. The 1986 Supreme 
Court decision in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc. requires 
plaintiffs to allege that newly merged firms will act anticompetitively in 
a way that injures the plaintiffs. To make such allegations successfully, 
plaintiffs must rely on accepted theories of antitrust liability, which will 
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often sound in the predatory behaviors prohibited by section 2. But as 
section 2 has shrunk, so too has the ability to challenge the merger. 
INTRODUCTION 
Disdain for market power has deep roots in American history.1 
Market power has a corrosive effect on society. It exacerbates 
inequality2 and makes society more exclusive.3 And when taken too 
far, market power even erodes democracy.4 Alarmed by the degree of 
market power wielded by monopolists in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries,5 Congress passed two landmark antitrust laws—
the Sherman Antitrust Act of 18906 and the Clayton Act of 1914.7 The 
Sherman Act has only two short sections, the second of which 
(hereinafter, “section 2”) is devoted to preventing monopolistic 
unilateral behavior.8 Put differently, section 2 prohibits 
anticompetitive behavior by a single firm.9 In addition to the Sherman 
Act’s general prohibitions on anticompetitive conduct, section 7 of the 
Clayton Act specifically prohibits business combinations—mergers 
and acquisitions—that “substantially lessen competition” or “tend to 
 
 1. Cf., e.g., FREDERIC M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE 
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 18 (3d ed. 1990) (arguing that “[l]imiting the power of both 
government bodies and private individuals to make decisions that shape people’s lives was a 
fundamental goal of the men who wrote the U.S. Constitution” and citing James Madison as an 
example). 
 2. See Jason Furman & Peter Orszag, A Firm-Level Perspective on the Role of Rents in the 
Rise in Inequality 2–3 (Oct. 16, 2015) (unpublished manuscript), http://gabriel-
zucman.eu/files/teaching/FurmanOrszag15.pdf [https://perma.cc/4RBK-5C2F] (explaining 
different ways increased rents can impact inequality); see also Eric Posner & Glen Weyl, The Real 
Villain Behind Our New Gilded Age, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/01/opinion/monopoly-power-new-gilded-age.html 
[https://perma.cc/3M32-L2GJ] (“Market power both reduces growth and increases inequality.”). 
 3. Daron Acemoglu & James A. Robinson, Is This Time Different? Capture and Anti-
Capture of U.S. Politics, 9 ECONOMISTS’ VOICE, no. 3, Mar. 2012, DOI: 10.1515/1553-3832.1902, 
PDF at 2 (noting that monopoly “exclud[es] people from profitable economic opportunities”). 
 4. See Luigi Zingales, Towards a Political Theory of the Firm, 31 J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 
2017, at 113, 113 (stating that large corporations have “enough money to capture . . . a majority 
of the elected representatives”). 
 5. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, WARREN S. GRIMES & CHRISTOPHER L. SAGERS, THE 
LAW OF ANTITRUST: AN INTEGRATED HANDBOOK 5 (3d ed. 2016) (“Chief among [the goals of 
the Sherman Act] was to prevent the high prices associated with monopoly and cartel activity 
. . . .”). 
 6. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 7. Clayton Act of 1914, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 
15 U.S.C.). 
 8. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 9. Id. § 1. 
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create a monopoly.”10 Contemplating vigorous enforcement and 
compensation to those injured by violations, the antitrust laws provide 
a private right of action as part of their remedial scheme, allowing 
injured firms to sue for both damages and injunctive relief.11 
In theory, mergers can benefit consumers by generating 
efficiencies through economies of scale and vertical integration.12 But 
mergers also risk harming competition and consumers by giving firms 
increased power in the marketplace to raise prices, control the inputs 
of production, and stifle competitors.13 The effect of mergers in the 
U.S. has been, at best, a mixed bag, suggesting that the U.S. has gone 
too far in its embrace of business combinations.14 There is compelling 
empirical evidence that frequent mergers have led to increased market 
concentration—the degree to which a small number of firms control a 
relevant market. And economic theory suggests that increased market 
power accompanies higher levels of market concentration.15  
One recent study found that market concentration increased in 75 
percent of industries in the U.S. over the last twenty years.16 
Unsurprisingly, firm profitability increased in industries in which 
market concentration increased, but only as a result of a firm’s ability 
to “extract higher profit margins” through price markups, rather than 
as a result of increased efficiency.17 Another recent paper measured 
the merger and acquisition (“M&A”) effects in U.S. manufacturing 
industries and found an increase in price markups with “little 
 
 10. Id. § 18. 
 11. Id. §§ 15(a), 26. 
 12. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE 668–70 (5th ed. 2016) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP (5th ed. 2016)] 
(explaining how the competitive dynamics of mergers have the potential to be both efficiency-
enhancing and anticompetitive). 
 13. See id. 
 14. See Robert Pitofsky, Reinvigorating Merger Enforcement That Has Declined as a Result 
of Conservative Economic Analysis, in HOW THE CHICAGO SCHOOL OVERSHOT THE MARK: THE 
EFFECT OF CONSERVATIVE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS ON U.S. ANTITRUST 233, 233–34 (Robert 
Pitofsky ed., 2008) [hereinafter CHICAGO SCHOOL] (summarizing Baker & Shapiro, infra note 
35, as arguing that the antitrust enforcement in the U.S. had been inadequate). 
 15. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER 
GUIDELINES 3 (2010) (“Mergers that cause a significant increase in concentration and result in 
highly concentrated markets are presumed to be likely to enhance market power . . . .”); see also 
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION AND ITS 
PRACTICE 109–10 (1st ed. 1994) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP (1st ed. 1994)] (explaining how market 
share can be used as a proxy for market power, all else equal). 
 16. Gustavo Grullon, Yelena Larkin & Roni Michaely, Are U.S. Industries Becoming More 
Concentrated?, REV. FIN. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 2), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2612047 
[https://perma.cc/CKX3-WZN4]. 
 17. Id. at 3. 
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evidence” of “efficiency gains.”18 Other analyses demonstrate similar 
results.19 Further, increased market concentration is not just bad for 
consumers; it hurts workers as well. More concentrated industries carry 
a lower labor share of output,20 which is the part of “economic output 
that accrues to workers as compensation in exchange for their labor.”21 
Against this empirical backdrop, it is critical to identify and 
remove impediments to robust enforcement of the merger laws. In the 
context of private suits, one barrier to effective enforcement is the 
connection between the antitrust injury doctrine and section 2 of the 
Sherman Act drawn by the Supreme Court in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort 
of Colorado, Inc.22 In addition to meeting the general requirements for 
Article III standing, private plaintiffs must also satisfy a set of special, 
prudential standing doctrines created by the Supreme Court, 
collectively known as “antitrust standing.”23 One such requirement is 
that a plaintiff must demonstrate that they suffered an “antitrust 
injury.”24 An antitrust injury is an “injury of the type that the antitrust 
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes 
defendants’ acts unlawful.”25 That is, the plaintiff’s theory of injury 
must derive directly from the anticompetitive characteristics of the 
defendant’s conduct.26 
 
 18. Bruce A. Blonigen & Justin R. Pierce, Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on Market 
Power and Efficiency 5 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series Divs. of Research & Statistics & Monetary 
Affairs Fed. Reserve Bd., FEDS Working Paper No. 2016-082, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2852716 [https://perma.cc/484T-VNFL].  
 19. See, e.g., Corporate Concentration: The Creep of Consolidation Across America’s 
Corporate Landscape, ECONOMIST (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.economist.com/graphic-
detail/2016/03/24/corporate-concentration [https://perma.cc/UJ33-8W6S] (noting increased 
market concentration in the U.S.); Orley C. Ashenfelter, Daniel Hosken & Matthew C. 
Weinberg, Did Robert Bork Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers? Evidence from 
Consummated Mergers 18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19939, 2014), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2403663 [https://perma.cc/H4JB-74UL] (surveying forty-nine academic 
studies that review merger effects and noting that thirty-six of them “find evidence of merger 
induced price increases”). 
 20. Simcha Barkai, Declining Labor and Capital Shares 8 (2017) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, London Business School), http://home.uchicago.edu/~barkai/doc/
BarkaiDecliningLaborCapital.pdf [https://perma.cc/WD64-EJCU].  
 21. Michael D. Giandrea & Shawn A. Sprague, Estimating the U.S. Labor Share, BUREAU 
LAB. STAT. (Feb. 2017), https://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2017/article/estimating-the-us-labor-
share.htm [https://perma.cc/6RKK-8V2F].  
 22. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986). 
 23. See HOVENKAMP (5th ed. 2016), supra note 12, at 812–13 (listing the three antitrust 
standing requirements: (1) that the plaintiff suffered an injury, (2) that the injury is an “antitrust 
injury,” and (3) “that [the] injur[y] w[as] caused by the antitrust violation”). 
 24. See infra Part II. 
 25. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). 
 26. Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990). 
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In Cargill, the Court established a narrow antitrust injury standard 
for a competitor-plaintiff challenging a rival firm’s anticompetitive 
merger. Instead of asking whether the merger itself reduced 
competition in a way that might injure the plaintiff, the Court focused 
its antitrust injury analysis on the hypothesized post-merger conduct of 
the new entity, asking whether the new entity would itself act 
anticompetitively.27  
By focusing the antitrust injury inquiry on the speculated conduct 
of the merged entity, the Court effectively forced a plaintiff challenging 
a merger to identify two antitrust violations in order to have standing. 
First, the plaintiff must allege that the merger is anticompetitive; and 
second, the plaintiff must allege that the new firm will act 
anticompetitively in a way that injured or will injure the plaintiff.28 
Because the second theory of injury will turn on the conduct of the new 
firm—a single entity—a competitor-plaintiff will often rely on section 
2 of the Sherman Act.29  
However, in the thirty years since Cargill was decided, the Court 
has significantly narrowed the scope of section 2 liability. Today, it is 
very difficult for a firm to seek refuge in the antitrust laws against a 
rival firm that is acting anticompetitively.30 In three cases,31 the Court 
has cast doubt on a competitor-firm’s ability to seek redress in the 
antitrust laws by all but eliminating a duty to deal with one’s rivals, 
narrowing the definition of predatory pricing, and generally viewing 
claims of monopolistic behavior skeptically.32 
By narrowing the scope of anticompetitive behavior under section 
2, the Court has decreased plaintiffs’ ability to show that post-merger 
firms will act anticompetitively. This has effectively cut out competitors 
from the statutory right of action to challenge anticompetitive 
mergers.33 In light of this doctrinal narrowing, mounting evidence that 
business combinations are frequently anticompetitive, and rising levels 
of market concentration in the U.S., the Court should overturn the 
Cargill decision. 
 
 27. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 114–15; see also infra Part II.A (discussing Cargill). 
 28. See infra text accompanying note 55; infra Part II.B.  
 29. See infra Part IV. 
 30. See infra Part III. 
 31. Pac. Bell Telephone Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 442 (2008); Verizon 
Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
 32. See infra Part III.B. 
 33. See infra Part IV. 
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This Note proceeds in five parts. Part I reviews the merger 
enforcement landscape in the U.S., noting decreased levels of public 
enforcement. Part II discusses the Cargill decision and antitrust injury 
in the merger context. Part III reviews section 2 and examines the three 
cases since Cargill that narrow antitrust liability, focusing in particular 
on a competitor’s new inability to use section 2 to protect itself. Part 
IV analyzes the interaction between section 2 and the antitrust injury 
doctrine, discussing how the narrower scope of section 2 collaterally 
impacts private merger challenges. Finally, Part V argues that the 
Court should both overrule the Cargill decision and reexamine the 
antitrust injury doctrine covering mergers. 
I.  THE MERGER ENFORCEMENT LANDSCAPE 
With the rise in market concentration and its associated effects, it 
is worth asking why the nation’s most powerful antitrust enforcers, the 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”), have not been more aggressive in enforcing the Clayton Act’s 
prohibition against anticompetitive mergers.34 Enforcement of the 
merger laws by the FTC and DOJ has notably declined since the 
Reagan administration.35 This Note acknowledges the decline in 
enforcement and suggests three potential explanations. First, antitrust 
law is becoming increasingly international; the FTC and DOJ now have 
the difficult job of policing international price cartels.36 Second, general 
resource constraints caution against bringing lawsuits where the 
government might lose. Third and finally, merger challenges have been 
treated more skeptically by the courts, a possible indication that 
substantive merger law has changed.37 
 
 34. See F.M. Scherer, Conservative Economics and Antitrust: A Variety of Influences, in 
CHICAGO SCHOOL, supra note 14, at 30, 36 (noting the “significant backtracking in antitrust 
precedents and enforcement”). 
 35. Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Reinvigorating Horizontal Merger Enforcement, in 
CHICAGO SCHOOL, supra note 14, at 235, 244–51; Jonathan B. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Evaluating 
Merger Enforcement During the Obama Administration, 65 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 28, 29–30 
(2012).  
 36. JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING 419–24 (2d ed. 2007).  
 37. For examples of where the courts have been overly critical of merger challenges, see 
Jonathan S. Baker & Carl Shapiro, Detecting and Reversing the Decline in Horizontal Merger 
Enforcement, 22 ANTITRUST, no. 3, Summer 2008, at 29, 32 (first citing United States v. Syufy 
Enters., 903 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1990); and then citing United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 
2d 1098, 1106 (N.D. Cal. 2004)). See also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 467 (“[T]he law of 
merger and acquisition has become much more permissive in the past few decades . . . .”). 
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In light of the Clayton Act’s strong statutory authorization for 
private enforcement,38 private merger lawsuits could be part of the 
solution to addressing increased market concentration. And yet, 
private challenges to mergers are infrequent.39 The prevailing attitude 
among practitioners is that private antitrust lawsuits represent only a 
slight risk during merger negotiations.40 Depending on the plaintiff’s 
status as a market participant (competitor, consumer, etc.), the two 
major concerns with private party enforcement are scope and 
incentives. The language of the Clayton Act is quite broad, granting a 
private right of action to “[a]ny person”41 injured by an antitrust 
violation. Accordingly, courts worry about overenforcement, 
excessively complex litigation, and an endless number of potential 
plaintiffs.42 There is also a fear that competitors will abuse the antitrust 
laws for selfish ends,43 challenging mergers when they anticipate that 
the merged entity will gain an efficiency advantage.44 
 
 38. See Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 129 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) 
(“Effective enforcement of the antitrust laws has always depended largely on the work of private 
attorney generals, for whom Congress made special provision in the Clayton Act itself.”); see also 
Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private Incentives and 
Public Enforcement, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1, 11 (1995) (“The antitrust statutes contain exceptionally 
powerful private remedies, comparable in scope and effect to the remedies available under public 
enforcement.”). 
 39. See HOVENKAMP (5th ed. 2016), supra note 12, at 671 (noting “the relatively small 
number of merger cases brought by private plaintiffs”); see also EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN 
GERADIN, GLOBAL ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS 916 (2d ed. 2011) (“[P]rivate parties 
rarely seek to challenge a merger that the agency has cleared.”); SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 5, 
at 479 (“Neither the states nor private plaintiffs have ever been especially prominent in merger 
enforcement . . . .”); Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev. [OECD], Working Party No. 3 on Co-
operation and Enforcement: Relationship Between Public and Private Antitrust Enforcement, at 6, 
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2015)11 (June 9, 2015), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/
publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DAF/COMP/WP3/WD(2015)11&docLanguage=En 
[https://perma.cc/598E-T3DF] (“Private merger litigation is possible, but unusual.”).  
 40. Cf. M. Sean Royall & Adam J. Di Vincenzo, When Mergers Become a Private Matter: An 
Updated Antitrust Primer, 26 ANTITRUST, no. 2, Spring 2012, at 41, 41 (observing that “antitrust 
merger challenges launched by private parties . . . [are] infrequent and often unsuccessful”). 
 41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15(a), 26 (2012). 
 42. Cf. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 739–41 (1977) (describing joinder of all the 
potential lawsuits as “impractical” in a case that limited enforcement of the antitrust laws to 
indirect purchasers). 
 43. See Brodley, supra note 38, at 48 (“Some commentators have joined the negative chorus, 
asserting that competitors in antitrust cases are almost always wrongly motivated.”). 
 44. Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioners, Cargill Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986) (No. 85-473), 
1986 WL 727374, at *9–12. 
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Although consumers are the ideal plaintiffs to bring suits 
challenging anticompetitive mergers,45 the stark reality is that their 
individual interests are simply too small to warrant litigation.46 
Moreover, consumers are often concerned with short-term price 
decreases, whereas the price increase following a merger may occur 
only over a longer time horizon.47 Thus, rival firms are better situated 
than consumers to challenge mergers as private plaintiffs—holding a 
competitive stake in a specific market makes them more attentive to 
the impact of a merger.48 
Fears about competitors as plaintiffs are overblown for several 
reasons. First, because horizontal mergers increase concentration and 
thus the potential for collusion,49 a competitor challenging a horizontal 
merger between rivals might fear retaliation for refusal to participate 
in the collusive behavior.50 Additionally, competitors might also 
reasonably fear that a vertical merger will exclude them from vital 
upstream inputs or downstream markets, perhaps eventually forcing 
them out of business.51 Given the narrowing of section 2 liability,52 such 
fears are not without merit. Because rival firms possess the financial 
incentives and industry knowledge to mount viable challenges to 
anticompetitive mergers,53 and because private enforcement is part of 
the antitrust laws’ remedial scheme, obstacles should be cleared away. 
One of these obstacles, discussed below, is the antitrust injury 
framework laid out in the Supreme Court’s decision in Cargill. In 
tandem with the Court’s increasingly narrow interpretation of section 
2, the Cargill decision hinders private enforcement by making it 
difficult to satisfy antitrust standing requirements. 
 
 45. Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and Illinois Brick, 100 
IOWA L. REV. 2115, 2117 (2015) (“Consumers, by contrast, are, in some sense, the perfect antitrust 
plaintiffs. They are the intended beneficiaries of the competitive markets that antitrust policy 
seeks to encourage . . . .”). 
 46. See Brodley, supra note 38, at 36–37 (describing how consumers lack both the sufficient 
monetary incentive to justify litigation and the understanding of the industry to pursue litigation). 
 47. Id.  
 48. See id. at 47 (“As compared with other business litigants, competitors are generally the 
best-placed firms to pursue merger litigation.”). 
 49. See Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested Approach, 21 
STAN. L. REV. 1562, 1603 (1969) (“Collusion is more difficult in a market that has a large number 
of sellers than in one with relatively few . . . .”). 
 50. Brodley, supra note 38, at 49. 
 51. See infra Part IV. 
 52. See infra Part III. 
 53. See Brodley, supra note 38, at 50 (providing extensive analysis of the capabilities, 
incentives, and considerations of competitors as plaintiffs to challenge mergers). 
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II.  A FAILED APPROACH TO MERGER ANTIRUST INJURY 
Private antitrust plaintiffs must show an antitrust injury—one 
derived directly from the anticompetitive aspects of the defendant’s 
conduct.54 When a competitor-plaintiff challenges a merger involving 
its rival, the Court has held that the question of antitrust injury is not 
whether the merger is anticompetitive, but rather whether the post-
merger firm will behave in a way that is anticompetitive. As a result, 
the plaintiff must essentially allege two antitrust violations: (1) the 
anticompetitive merger and (2) speculated anticompetitive conduct of 
the new firm.55 Frequently, this second theory will be brought under 
section 2 of the Sherman Act,56 which prohibits anticompetitive 
unilateral conduct by making it illegal to “monopolize, or attempt to 
monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several 
States.”57 Using section 2 makes sense, given that the plaintiff, who has 
to consider how the new, merged firm will act, will rely on theories of 
anticompetitive behavior that involve a single firm. 
A. The Creation of Antitrust Injury for Mergers 
The genesis of the Court’s antitrust injury doctrine involved a 
challenge to an acquisition. In Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 
Inc.,58 the plaintiffs, operators of bowling alleys, sued for damages for 
lost income when the defendant, the nation’s largest bowling alley 
operator, acquired failing bowling alleys within the plaintiff’s market.59 
Rather than close the beleaguered alleys, the defendant kept them 
open, depriving the plaintiffs of the increased profits and market power 
they would have enjoyed had the alleys been shuttered.60 In deciding 
the case, the Court reasoned that the purpose of the antitrust laws is to 
protect competition. And by saving the failing bowling alleys, the 
acquisition actually preserved competition by maintaining the number 
of market participants. Thus, the plaintiffs did not suffer an injury for 
which the antitrust laws would provide relief.61 The Court held that, in 
 
 54. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 55. See infra Part II.B. 
 56. See HOVENKAMP (5th ed. 2016), supra note 12, at 671 (“Nevertheless, in the relatively 
small number of merger cases brought by plaintiffs, the underlying rationale is most often 
exclusionary practices such as predatory pricing.” (citation omitted)). 
 57. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 58. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). 
 59. Id. at 479. 
 60. Id. at 481. 
 61. Id. at 488. 
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order to bring a valid claim, a plaintiff must show an injury “of the type 
the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that 
which makes defendants’ acts unlawful.”62  
In 1986, the Court, in a seminal moment, extended the antitrust 
injury doctrine to injunctive lawsuits challenging mergers in Cargill, 
Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.63 The nation’s fifth largest beef 
packer, Monfort, sued to enjoin a merger between the second and third 
largest beef packers.64 The Court began its analysis by comparing the 
difference in language between sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act.65 
On one hand, section 4 sets out the private right of action for damages 
under the antitrust laws and requires a plaintiff to allege an actual 
injury to “business or property.”66 On the other hand, section 16 
provides the right of action for an injunctive suit, which requires only 
a “threatened” injury.67 The Court held that both provisions require 
the showing of an injury or threatened “injury of the type the antitrust 
laws were designed to prevent.”68  
The Court then rejected both of Monfort’s alleged threatened 
antitrust injuries that would result from the merger.69 As for the first 
theory, Monfort argued that the merger would increase the efficiency 
of the merged firm, thus enabling it to lower prices and gain additional 
market share.70 In turn, Monfort would have to lower its own prices 
and, therefore, would suffer an injury in the form of lost profits.71 The 
Court rejected this theory. Relying on Brunswick, the Court stated that 
this argument amounted to a complaint of increased price 
competition—a type of business behavior the antitrust laws were 
enacted to preserve.72  
Monfort’s second theory was that the merged firm would engage 
in predatory pricing—valuing goods below cost in order to drive its 
 
 62. Id. at 489. 
 63. Cargill Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 106–07 (1986); see also Brodley, supra 
note 38, at 5 (“The Cargill decision is notable . . . because the Court applied the antitrust injury 
doctrine to a merger injunction action.”). 
 64. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 106–07. 
 65. Id. at 110–11 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (2012)). 
 66. Id. at 111 (citing 15 U.S.C § 15(a)). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. (citation omitted).  
 69. Id. at 114.  
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 115. 
 72. Id. at 115 (citing Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977)). 
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competitors out of business.73 The Court found that the allegation of 
predatory pricing was a viable theory of antitrust injury but ultimately 
rejected the plaintiff’s claim because it had not properly alleged a 
credible threat of predatory pricing and therefore did not have 
standing.74 
In a dissent joined by Justice White, Justice Stevens criticized the 
majority for what he perceived as an ill-advised approach to antitrust 
injury for injunctive suits challenging mergers.75 Specifically, the 
dissent criticized the Court for focusing entirely on the alleged post-
merger behavior of the new, merged entity instead of the more 
proximate question of whether the merger itself would damage 
competition.76 In Stevens’s view, “[w]hen the proof discloses a 
reasonable probability that competition will be harmed as a result of a 
merger, [the Court should] also conclude that there is a reasonable 
probability that a competitor of the merging firms will suffer some 
corresponding harm in due course.”77  
The dissent distinguished Brunswick in several ways. First, 
Brunswick dealt with a damages claim under a separate section of the 
Clayton Act where the plaintiff must prove an actual injury.78 Second, 
and more critically, the facts of the merger were completely different. 
Brunswick involved an acquisition that buoyed competition by keeping 
suppliers open, thereby denying the plaintiffs the market power that 
they would have accrued absent the merger.79 In Cargill, by contrast, 
the merger reduced the number of market participants and therefore 
reduced competition. The dissent also focused closely on the specific 
language and legislative history of sections 7 and 16 of the Clayton Act, 
which revealed Congress’s intent to provide a broad scope of injunctive 
relief.80 The dissent concluded by observing that Congress’s intent to 
have vigorous private enforcement was reaffirmed just ten years before 
Cargill, when Congress authorized recovery of plaintiff’s attorney’s 
fees.81 Taken as a whole, the dissent expressed confidence that 
 
 73. Id. at 117. Predatory Pricing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining 
“predatory pricing” as “pricing below an appropriate measure of cost for the purpose of 
eliminating competitors in the short run and reducing competition in the long run”). 
 74. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 119. 
 75. Id. at 122–29 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 76. Id. at 122–23. 
 77. Id. at 128–29. 
 78. Id. at 128. 
 79. Id.  
 80. Id. at 125–26. 
 81. Id. at 129. 
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Congress wanted anticompetitive mergers enjoined, and that the Court 
had no business erecting additional barriers obstructing that goal.82 
B. The Trouble with Antitrust Injury in Merger Suits 
The Court’s decision in Cargill largely divorces the question of 
antitrust injury from the existence of an illegal merger. A merger might 
“substantially lessen competition” or “tend to create a monopoly” and, 
therefore, be illegal.83 Yet Cargill only permits private plaintiffs to 
challenge the illegal merger if they can sufficiently allege that the post-
merger firm will act in an anticompetitive way that injures them.84 The 
Court has consistently maintained this antitrust injury approach in 
other areas of antitrust law; even if there is an antitrust violation, and 
even if the plaintiff is injured indirectly by the violation, the plaintiff 
will not have standing unless the injuries flow directly from the 
characteristics of the violation that make it illegal.85 The reasons for 
this doctrine are understandable—it helps align private remedies with 
the underlying goals of antitrust86 and ensures that antitrust laws are 
not being used, as in Brunswick, to compensate businesses for losses 
resulting from competition.87  
The particular problem with the antitrust injury framework, in the 
merger context, is that it effectively asks the plaintiff to allege two 
separate antitrust violations by the defendant. A plaintiff must allege 
not only that the merger is anticompetitive, but also that the merged 
entity is likely to violate antitrust laws in a way that harms the plaintiff. 
The Court in Cargill may not explicitly have held that the plaintiff 
needed to identify by name an antitrust violation that the merged entity 
would commit; however, the practical effect of the decision is to force 
 
 82. Id. at 122–29. 
 83. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). 
 84. See Cargill, 479 U.S. at 115–19 (explaining that the competitor-plaintiff did not allege an 
antitrust injury sufficient to challenge an anticompetitive practice because it did not sufficiently 
allege a credible claim of future predatory pricing by the merged firm). 
 85. For cases analyzing the antitrust injury in, for example, price-fixing schemes, see Atlantic 
Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 339 (1990) (holding that even though the 
defendant’s conduct violated substantive antitrust law as an illegal price-fixing scheme, the 
competitor-plaintiff did not suffer an antitrust injury because the plaintiff’s injuries did not flow 
from the anticompetitive aspects of the defendant’s conduct); Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., 
Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986) (explaining that even if there was a conspiracy 
to fix prices between Japanese television manufacturers, plaintiffs, who were American television 
manufacturers, would not have suffered an antitrust injury because they would have benefitted 
from the conspiracy). 
 86. John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, Who Suffered Antitrust Injury in the Microsoft 
Case?, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 832 (2001). 
 87. Id.  
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courts to compare the alleged post-merger conduct against theories of 
Sherman Act violations.88 Indeed, the lower courts, when analyzing 
competitor standing in merger lawsuits, compare alleged post-merger 
conduct against recognized antitrust violations.89 
This subsequent violation can be alleged under a collusive or 
unilateral theory in violation of sections 1 or 2, respectively.90 But in 
either case, the ability to challenge the merger’s competitiveness 
depends on the scope of liability for the subsequent antitrust 
violation.91 And for section 2, the scope of liability has been 
dramatically narrowed. 
III.  IN THE SHADOW OF CARGILL: A CHANGE IN SECTION 2 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Prior to the late 1980s, the Court embraced a broader theory of 
how firms can run afoul of section 2. In the years following Cargill, 
however, the Court has tightened liability for monopolistic conduct 
under section 2. In three particular cases, the Court has cast a shadow 
of skepticism over a competitor-firm’s ability to seek refuge under the 
antitrust laws for highly aggressive conduct by its rival. 
A. Robust Section 2 Liability in the Pre-Cargill Era 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits anticompetitive unilateral 
conduct by making it illegal to “monopolize, or attempt to monopolize 
 
 88. Cargill, 479 U.S. at 122–23 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the Court’s approach as 
“deny[ing] relief unless the plaintiff can prove a violation of the Sherman Act”). 
 89. See, e.g., Pool Water Prods. v. Olin Corp., 258 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (denying 
standing to a competitor suing for damages after a merger because the plaintiffs could not show 
that the below-cost prices charged met the standard for predatory pricing); R.C. Bigelow, Inc. v. 
Unilever N.V., 867 F.2d 102, 111 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that a competitor had standing to enjoin 
a merger where it was alleged that the merged firm would have monopoly power and would 
eliminate competition by foreclosing downstream channels to the plaintiff); Phototron Corp. v. 
Eastman Kodak Co., 842 F.2d 95, 100–01 (5th Cir. 1988) (denying standing because the plaintiffs 
had only alleged that the merged firm would sell below cost, not that it would act predatorily); 
Novation Ventures, LLC v. J.G. Wentworth Co., LLC, 156 F. Supp. 3d 1094, 1102 (C.D. Cal. 2015) 
(denying standing because plaintiff did not adequately plead facts that the merged entity 
foreclosed the plaintiff from competing in the market); Sprint Nextel Corp. v. AT&T Inc., 821 F. 
Supp. 2d 308, 320 (D.D.C. 2011) (holding the plaintiffs had standing to enjoin a merger after 
alleging that the merged firm’s monopsony power would allow it to foreclose the market to 
inputs).  
 90. See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 39, at 12 (explaining that section 1 of the Sherman 
Act addresses anticompetitive and collusive agreements between market participants while 
section 2 of the Sherman Act addresses anticompetitive conduct by a single firm). 
 91. See infra Part IV. 
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. . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States.”92 
Monopolization has been interpreted to require that a firm have 
“monopoly power in the relevant market” and engage in some conduct 
that is considered anticompetitive.93 These two elements, power and 
conduct, present challenges. The market power element is difficult 
because it is not always clear what constitutes the relevant market.94 
Once the market is defined, though, both economic theory95 and 
evidence96 strongly suggest that market power is more likely to exist in 
highly concentrated markets. The conduct element has also been 
particularly perplexing for courts because it is often difficult to 
distinguish between normal competitive business practices—which are 
encouraged in a free market system—and anticompetitive ones.97  
Because distinguishing between normal business competition and 
anticompetitive practices is challenging, many of the Court’s section 2 
cases have involved attempts by firms to exclude rivals from the 
market.98 Until recently, the Court used a broader interpretation of 
section 2 liability in these cases.99 Indeed, Cargill was decided just one 
year after Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,100 which 
represented this more robust interpretation.101 
The suit at issue involved four ski mountains in Colorado.102 The 
defendant owned three of the four mountains, having acquired one 
 
 92. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012). 
 93. ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 39, at 265. 
 94. See, e.g., United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 394 (1956) 
(analyzing whether the relevant market was defined as cellophane or more broadly as “flexible 
packaging materials”). 
 95. See, e.g., supra note 15 and accompanying text; HOVENKAMP (5th ed. 2016), supra note 
12, at 109–10 (explaining how market share can be used as a proxy for market power, all else 
equal); ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 39 at 997–1002 (defining how horizontal mergers can 
allow a firm to exercise market power). 
 96. See supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text (reviewing empirical studies that 
demonstrate market power exists in concentrated markets).  
 97. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT 
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 9 (2008) (“Competitive and exclusionary conduct can 
look alike . . .  making it hard to distinguish conduct that should be deemed unlawful from conduct 
that should not.”).  
 98. ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 39, at 345.  
 99. See Robert Pitofsky, Chicago School and Dominant Firm Behavior, in CHICAGO 
SCHOOL, supra note 14, at 107 (“One of the most remarkable developments in recent years is 
hostility to section 2 enforcement by conservative scholars and in language in judicial decisions.”). 
 100. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).  
 101. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409–10 
(2004) (describing Aspen Skiing as “at or near the outer boundary of § 2 liability” and as a “limited 
exception” where liability can be imposed for refusal to deal with competitors). 
 102. Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 587–90. 
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from a separate company,103 while the plaintiff owned the fourth.104 The 
two companies originally coordinated to create an “all-Aspen ticket” 
that gave guests a convenient way to ski all four mountains, allocating 
revenues between the companies accordingly.105 The option was widely 
popular among consumers.106 After taking a series of steps to reduce 
cooperation, however, the defendant eventually discontinued 
participation in the “all-Aspen Ticket” altogether.107 The plaintiff’s 
revenues declined sharply as a result of not being able to offer its guests 
convenient access to all four mountains.108  
The Court affirmed a jury verdict finding the defendant liable for 
illegal monopolization under section 2.109 In reaching its decision, the 
Court used a deferential standard of review and was keen to not disturb 
the jury’s conclusions.110 Routinely referring to the defendant as “the 
monopolist,” the Court admonished business strategies that were not 
based on either improving goods or lowering costs.111 The Court 
ultimately found it critical that the defendant offered no legitimate 
business decision for the refusal to deal except for the “perceived 
[negative] long-run impact on its smaller rival.”112  
At the time Cargill was decided, the Court may have understood 
Aspen Skiing—then a fresh decision—as preserving a broad scope 
conception of section 2 liability. Instead, Aspen Skiing was a high-water 
mark. 
B. Strangling Section 2 
Since Aspen Skiing and Cargill, the Court has issued a series of 
decisions that greatly narrow liability under section 2. Because the 
Court takes so few antitrust cases, each case casts a wide shadow and 
 
 103. Id.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See id. at 591 (“By 1977, multiarea tickets accounted for nearly 35% of the total 
market.”). 
 107. Id. at 593–94. 
 108. Id. at 594–95. 
 109. Id. at 611. 
 110. Id. at 604–05. 
 111. See id. at 605 (“If a firm has been ‘attempting to exclude rivals on some basis other than 
efficiency,’ it is fair to characterize its behavior as predatory.”); see also id. at 596 (quoting the 
trial court’s instructions to the jury to distinguish “between practices which tend to exclude or 
restrict competition on the one hand, and the success of a business which reflects only a superior 
product, a well-run business, or luck, on the other” (citation omitted)). 
 112. Id. at 611–12. 
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holds outsized influence.113 Thus, in just three cases, the Court has 
dramatically limited the scope of liability under section 2. In Brooke 
Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,114 the Court made 
predatory pricing harder to prove. In Verizon Communications Inc. v. 
Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP,115 the Court confined Aspen 
Skiing to its facts and spoke strongly of the virtues of unbridled 
competition with little regard for the traditional worries of monopoly 
power.  And finally, in Pacific Bell Telephone Company v. Linkline 
Communications, Inc.,116 the Court employed formalist reasoning to 
reject price-squeezing as an antitrust violation. These decisions, taken 
together, greatly narrow the scope of liability under section 2. 
In Brooke Group, the Court affirmed a decision to set aside a jury 
verdict that found liability for predatory pricing during price wars in 
the tobacco industry.117 Predatory pricing can be measured using 
different metrics,118 but, at its core, predatory pricing occurs when a 
firm prices below its costs in order to force a rival out of business. By 
lowering prices in the short term, the firm will be able to raise prices in 
the long run with less competition.119 Because the predatory firm must 
forgo some short-term profits—and take on the risk that the scheme 
will fail—the Court has come to believe that “predatory pricing 
schemes are rarely tried, and even more rarely successful.”120 
Furthermore, courts have been extremely hesitant to find liability for 
predatory pricing as lower prices are beneficial to consumers and often 
result from vigorous price competition.121 The Brooke Group Court 
continued to enforce the rule that a plaintiff must show that the 
 
 113. See R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep’t Justice, 
Antitrust Law in the U.S. Supreme Court, Address at British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law Conference (May 11, 2004), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/antitrust-law-
us-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/GYZ5-5L7H] (“Because there are so few Supreme Court 
antitrust decisions each year . . . and because each one sets precedent that will govern the 
application of the antitrust laws in the lower courts for decades to come each decision is an event 
of major significance for antitrust enforcers and the antitrust bar.”). 
 114. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
 115. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).  
 116. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2008). 
 117. Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 212. 
 118. Compare id. at 222 & n.1 (using average variable cost as the measure for predatory 
pricing), with Commission Decision 2001/354/EC of 20 March 2001, 2001 O.J. (L 125) 1 (using 
long-run incremental cost as a measure for predatory pricing). 
 119. See text accompanying supra note 73 (defining predatory pricing). 
 120. Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 226 (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio 
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 589 (1986)). 
 121. See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 39, at 353 (noting that “competitive price-cutting 
is among the most desirable business activities”).  
2019] COLLATERAL DAMAGE 137 
defendant set prices below its variable cost,122 but the Court added a 
more onerous requirement that the plaintiff must prove that the 
defendant firm have a “dangerous probability” of recouping its lost 
short-term profits.123  
One commentator has called the belief that predatory pricing is 
rarely attempted as “contrary to fact”124 and indicated that data shows 
“selective price predation is a recurring phenomenon . . . used 
effectively to eliminate young rivals and to deter potential entry into 
noncompetitive markets.”125 Moreover, the Court in Brooke Group 
ignored the fact that a dominant firm can still operate profitably during 
a predatory pricing scheme because its scale allows it to produce at 
lower costs than a market entrant.126 The dominant firm can price 
below its young competitor’s costs, but still above its own, and thereby 
force its rival out of business while still operating profitably.127 
In addition to erecting the “dangerous probability” standard, the 
Court’s willingness to affirm the district court’s decision to throw out a 
jury’s finding of predatory pricing after a 115-day trial is striking.128 
Such a move raises a serious question of exactly how much evidence 
will be needed to make out a predatory pricing claim. Indeed, in 
dissent, Justice Stevens took the majority to task for rejecting so much 
evidence, arguing that the majority’s “conclusion rest[ed] on a 
hodgepodge of legal, factual, and economic propositions that are 
insufficient, alone or together, to overcome the jury’s assessment of the 
evidence.”129  
The Court further narrowed section 2 in Verizon Communications 
Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP.130 As part of their 
statutory obligations under the 1996 Telecommunications Act, 
incumbent local exchange carriers (“LECs”) were obliged to allow 
competitors to access their local networks,131 with these obligations 
regulated and monitored by the Federal Communications Commission 
(“FCC”) and state regulators.132 The plaintiff, a customer in the local 
 
 122. Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 222 & n.1. 
 123. Id. at 224.  
 124. Eleanor M. Fox, The Efficiency Paradox, in CHICAGO SCHOOL, supra note 14, at 82. 
 125. Id. 
 126. ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 39, at 383. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 243; id. at 254 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. at 254 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 130. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). 
 131. Id. at 401–02. 
 132. Id. at 403–05. 
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New York City market, alleged that Verizon was failing to meet its 
statutory obligation to provide rivals local access and doing so “on a 
discriminatory basis as part of an anticompetitive scheme to discourage 
customers from becoming or remaining customers of competitive 
LECs.”133 The basis for the antitrust claim was a theory of liability 
under section 2 for an illegal refusal to deal.134 
In finding no liability under section 2, the Court went to great 
lengths to narrowly confine the precedential value of Aspen Skiing.135 
Declaring that “Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer boundary of § 2 
liability,” the Court distinguished Aspen Skiing by highlighting that the 
defendant ski company passed up on short-term profits, had a prior 
course of dealing with its rival, and was denying its rival a product that 
it already provided to customers at the retail level.136 The Court seized 
on these criteria to label Aspen Skiing as a “limited exception.”137 
A final case that narrows section 2 liability, and makes Trinko’s 
impact very clear, is Pacific Bell Telephone Company v. Linkline 
Communications, Inc.138 In Linkline, the Court held that Trinko 
forecloses a “price-squeeze” theory of liability, absent a duty to deal 
with the competitor.139 A price squeeze occurs when a firm with market 
power sells necessary component goods to a rival and also competes 
with that rival in a downstream market.140 The firm with market power 
can “squeeze” the margins of its competitor by raising component 
prices while simultaneously lowering prices on the downstream 
product.141  
In Linkline, plaintiffs were independent internet service providers 
(“ISPs”) that competed with AT&T in the retail internet market in 
California.142 The ISPs did not own all of the requisite infrastructure to 
provide internet to their customers and, therefore, leased a necessary 
upstream component from AT&T.143 Plaintiffs alleged that AT&T 
 
 133. Id. at 404. 
 134. Id. at 409. 
 135. Id. at 408–11. 
 136. Id. at 409–10. 
 137. Id. at 409. The Court also used the “already-providing-the-service-to-other-customers” 
logic to distinguish Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372–74 (1973), an earlier 
case that indicated a duty to deal with competitors under certain circumstances. Id. at 410. 
 138. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009). 
 139. Id. at 449–51.  
 140. ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 39, at 476. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Linkline, 555 U.S. at 442–43. 
 143. Id. at 443. 
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raised prices on the input component while simultaneously lowering 
prices for its retail internet prices.144 This had the effect of “squeezing” 
the ISPs’ profits because they were forced to lower their own retail 
internet prices while paying more for the input service.145 The Court 
treated Trinko as dispositive and held that, absent a duty to deal, a 
price squeeze is not an acceptable theory of liability under section 2.146 
According to the Court, if there is no duty to deal under Trinko, then 
there accordingly was no “duty to deal under terms and conditions that 
the rivals find commercially advantageous.”147 
The significance of these three cases is not necessarily in their 
specific dispositions. Modern antitrust law is a highly fact-specific, 
contextual discipline in which the particular industry, market structure, 
market concentration, barriers to entry, and product are all relevant.148 
The impact of these opinions comes from the language employed by 
the Court to describe section 2 as exceptionally permissive of 
aggressive unilateral behavior.149 Both Trinko and Linkline spoke in 
sweeping terms of a firm’s freedom to deal, even if at great costs to 
competitors. Of Trinko, for example, one commentator noted that 
“[n]owhere in [the Court’s] opinion is there an expression of concern 
about the traditional evils of dominance or monopoly power.”150 This 
language has influenced lower courts’ application of section 2.151 As 
 
 144. Id. at 443–44. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 449. 
 147. Id. at 449–50. 
 148. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat’l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 186, 191 (2010) 
(embracing a functionalist approach to determining when there is a single entity); Leegin Creative 
Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 879, 881–82 (2007) (overruling a nearly 100-year 
precedent in favor of applying the rule of reason, which is a balancing test for determining 
“whether a practice restrains trade” in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, to price 
maintenance agreements); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 4, 24–25 
(1979) (applying the rule of reason to certain price agreements among competitors); see also Carl 
Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 
ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 49–60 (2010) (applauding the 2010 merger guidelines’ embrace of the various 
complexities of specific markets). 
 149. See Harvey J. Goldschmid, Comment on Herbert Hovenkamp and the Dominant Firm: 
The Chicago School Has Made Us Too Cautious About False Positives and the Use of Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, in CHICAGO SCHOOL, supra note 14, at 125 (expressing concerns that the 
Court’s language “seriously undermines the traditional policy underpinnings of section 2”). 
 150. Id. 
 151. See, e.g., In re Adderall XR Antitrust Litig., 754 F.3d 128, 134–36 (2d Cir. 2014), as 
corrected, (June 19, 2014) (relying heavily on Trinko and describing Aspen Skiing as a “narrow 
exception”); Novell, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 731 F.3d 1064, 1072–74 (10th Cir. 2013) (citing 
Linkline and Trinko for the proposition that purely unilateral conduct has a strong presumption 
of legality and that there is a “general rule protecting unilateral conduct”). 
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discussed above, Brooke Group was significant because the Court was 
willing to look past a jury verdict supported by an extensive record.152 
Taken together, these decisions send a strong message to lower courts 
to be extremely skeptical of section 2 claims. 
Several beliefs animate these three decisions. Permeating each is 
a view that vigorous competition between rivals benefits consumers, 
along with a corresponding fear that imposing liability for aggressive 
unilateral conduct will result in false-positives. In the predatory-pricing 
context, the overriding concern is chilling aggressive price competition, 
which benefits consumers and is a cornerstone of the market system.153 
In the refusal-to-deal context, courts worry that forcing a firm to share 
with its rivals will discourage investment in “economically beneficial” 
assets or, perversely, “facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: 
collusion.”154 Moreover, there are also concerns about judicial 
administrability of liability rules in the antitrust context.155  
These section 2 cases dramatically narrow the scope of liability for 
unilateral conduct, especially when it comes to challenges by 
competitors. Because of serious and legitimate concerns about 
discouraging vigorous competition between rivals, competitors have 
few viable avenues to allege a section 2 claim. But perhaps unintended 
by the Court is the corresponding impact these decisions have had on 
a rival firm’s ability to challenge anticompetitive mergers. 
IV.  ANTITRUST INJURY AS INEXTRICABLY INTERTWINED WITH 
SECTION 2 
The narrowing of section 2 has had collateral consequences for 
enforcement of the merger laws. Cargill forces merger challengers to 
speculate on and allege a theory of anticompetitive conduct by the 
combined firm.156 And the theories of anticompetitive behaviors most 
used by merger challengers to make this showing are theories under 
 
 152. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.  
 153. Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 226 (1993) 
(“[T]he mechanism by which a firm engages in predatory pricing—lowering prices—is the same 
mechanism by which a firm stimulates competition; . . . mistaken inferences . . . are especially 
costly, because they chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.” (alteration 
and second omission in original) (quoting Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., 479 U.S. 104, 122 n.17 
(1986))). 
 154. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407–08 
(2004). 
 155. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 452–55 (2009); Trinko, 540 
U.S. at 411–13. 
 156. See supra Part II. 
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section 2.157 Recall, the Court in Cargill accepted predatory pricing as 
a viable theory of antitrust injury.158 In the wake of Brooke Group, 
however, it is difficult to see how a plaintiff can make out a successful 
claim under a predatory-pricing theory.159 Indeed, Brooke Group’s 
skepticism of predatory-pricing claims has impacted the lower courts’ 
standing analysis.160  
The effect of section 2’s narrowing is especially pronounced and 
potentially damaging in the context of a competitor’s ability to 
challenge an anticompetitive vertical acquisition. This is driven by the 
elimination of liability under a theory of a unilateral refusal to deal. 
Before Trinko, the prevailing view was that there were circumstances 
where a refusal to deal with a rival was grounds for a section 2 claim.161 
Even if those situations were generally limited, the language and 
impact of Trinko nonetheless makes clear that these exceptions are 
extremely narrow and, in all likelihood, need to all but replicate the 
facts of Aspen Skiing.162 As it stands now, a rival can acquire necessary 
upstream inputs or downstream revenue sources with the specific 
intention of choking off its rival. If the rival wants to challenge the 
vertical acquisition before it occurs, or recover damages after the fact, 
it must allege both that the merger itself is illegal and that the rival will 
suffer an antitrust injury as a result of the defendant’s post-acquisition 
 
 157. See HOVENKAMP (5th ed. 2016), supra note 12, at 671 (“Nevertheless, in the relatively 
small number of merger cases brought by private plaintiffs, the underlying rationale is most often 
exclusionary practices such as predatory pricing.”). 
 158. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 118 (1986) (“Predatory pricing is thus 
a practice . . . capable of inflicting antitrust injury.”). 
 159. See Sandeep Vaheesan, Reconsidering Brooke Group: Predatory Pricing in Light of the 
Empirical Learning, 12 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 81, 96 (2015) (“The Court has formulated a 
predatory pricing test that has made it virtually impossible for plaintiffs to bring successful 
claims.”). 
 160. See, e.g., Pool Water Prods. v. Olin Corp., 258 F.3d 1024, 1035 (9th Cir. 2001) (refusing 
to find standing for aggressive pricing because “[a]bsent proof of predation, it is immaterial 
whether the price reduction is the result of illegal price setting, illegal mergers and acquisitions, 
collusion, price discrimination or any other antitrust violation. . . . ‘[S]o long as they are above 
predatory levels, they do not threaten competition’” (quoting Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & 
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 233 (1993))).  
 161. See Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN. L. REV. 253, 261 
(2003) (writing in 2003 that “every federal circuit court has interpreted this general 
monopolization standard to impose an antitrust duty to deal with rivals when sharing is feasible 
and a monopolist has developed a product that is so superior that it is ‘essential’ for rivals to 
compete and cannot practicably be duplicated”). But see HOVENKAMP (1st ed. 1994), supra note 
15, at 264–65 (concluding that “[r]eading Aspen to create a new obligation to deal where no 
arrangement had existed before is a significant extension of its holding”). 
 162. See James A. Keyte, The Ripple Effects of Trinko: How It Is Affecting Section 2 Analysis, 
20 ANTITRUST 44, 47 (2005) (reviewing post-Trinko decisions and noting that “[a]s these cases 
reflect, Aspen has now effectively been limited to its facts”). 
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conduct. But, because there are so few exceptions to the general no-
duty-to-deal rule (other than the exact facts of Aspen Skiing), it is 
unclear how the plaintiff can show an antitrust injury.  
The case of SureShot Golf Ventures, Inc. v. Topgolf International, 
Inc.,163 a recent case out of the Fifth Circuit, illustrates this problem 
well. Founded in 2000, Topgolf is the dominant virtual golf simulation 
company in the United States.164 In 2014, SureShot Golf Ventures 
started as a competitor to Topgolf.165 Topgolf had developed its own 
proprietary ball-tracking technology, whereas SureShot licensed a ball-
tracking software called Protracer from a third party.166 SureShot sued 
Topgolf after Topgolf acquired Protracer and refused to agree to 
provide SureShot access to the software once its current five-year 
license expired.167 SureShot alleged that Topgolf acquired Protracer to 
prevent SureShot from competing in the market, bringing 
monopolization and attempted monopolization claims under the 
Sherman Act as well as an unlawful acquisition claim under section 7 
of the Clayton Act.168 
In its motion to dismiss, Topgolf attacked SureShot’s lawsuit on 
several fronts. First, Topgolf argued that SureShot’s claim was unripe, 
as it had not yet been denied access to Protracer.169 Next, Topgolf cited 
to Trinko for the proposition that it has no duty to deal with 
SureShot.170 And most critically, when specifically addressing the 
unlawful acquisition claim, Topgolf argued that “[f]or the same core 
reason that SureShot cannot plausibly allege anticompetitive effects 
for its [s]ection 2 claims, it also cannot plausibly allege anticompetitive 
effects for its [s]ection 7 and [s]ection 1 claims: Access to the Protracer 
Range System is not necessary for competition.”171 
The district court dismissed the suit.172 First, the court held that 
SureShot lacked Article III standing because, given that Topgolf had 
 
 163. SureShot Golf Ventures, Inc. v. Topgolf Int’l, Inc., No. 17-20607, 2018 WL 4927554 (5th 
Cir. Oct. 9, 2018) (per curiam), aff’g and modifying No. CV H-17-127, 2017 WL 3658948 (S.D. 
Tex. Aug. 24, 2017). 
 164. Id. at *1. 
 165. Id.  
 166. Id. at *2. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Brief in Support at 5, SureShot Golf Ventures, Inc. 
v. Topgolf Int’l, Inc., 2017 WL 3658948 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2017) (No. 4:17-cv-127). 
 170. Id. at 8. 
 171. Id. at 22 (emphasis added). 
 172. SureShot Golf Ventures, Inc. v. Topgolf Int’l, Inc., No. CV H-17-127, 2017 WL 3658948, 
at *6 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2017). 
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not yet denied access to Protracer, SureShot’s injuries were wholly 
speculative.173 The court also held that SureShot lacked antitrust 
standing on the theory that, had a different company—a third party—
acquired Protracer, SureShot would still have suffered the same 
injury.174 Finally, the court found that SureShot failed to plead that the 
acquisition would “substantially lessen competition or tend to create a 
monopoly.”175  
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, 
agreeing that SureShot’s claim was unripe.176 But, because it held that 
there was no subject-matter jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit did not 
address the question of whether SureShot had properly alleged an 
antitrust injury.177 
The SureShot case exemplifies the failure of Cargill’s post-merger 
inquiry. Both the district court and the court of appeals directed their 
entire analysis toward one issue: whether there was a real threat that 
the post-merger firm would do something anticompetitive. There was 
no mention as to whether the merger, as its own unique event, was 
damaging to competition. To be sure, this was a suit for damages,178 
and the Clayton Act’s language that a plaintiff be “injured in his 
business or property” calls for greater concreteness.179 But, 
importantly, both courts’ Article III holdings focused on post-merger 
conduct, suggesting that Cargill’s approach has also influenced how the 
courts think about constitutional standing in antitrust cases. In other 
words, it seems unlikely that SureShot would have had both Article III 
and antitrust standing to seek an injunction prior to the acquisition, 
even though the Clayton Act only requires a showing of “threatened 
loss or damage.”180  
While perhaps justifiable under the Court’s constitutional 
standing doctrines, such an outcome should be alarming for those who 
think that the Clayton Act’s private right of action is not a dead letter. 
If an antitrust plaintiff does not have standing to sue based on the 
 
 173. Id. at *4. 
 174. Id. at *5. 
 175. Id. 
 176. SureShot Golf Ventures, Inc. v. Topgolf Int’l, Inc., No. 17-20607, 2018 WL 4927554, at 
*5 (5th Cir. Oct. 9, 2018). 
 177. Id. at *5 n.3 (“Because the case is not ripe, we find it unnecessary to analyze whether 
SureShot alleged a cognizable antitrust injury as required for antitrust standing.”). 
 178. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint at 14, SureShot Golf Ventures, Inc. v. Topgolf Int’l, Inc., 
2017 WL 3658948 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2017) (No. 4:17-cv-127). 
 179. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109–10 (1986) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 15). 
 180. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (2018). 
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allegations in SureShot—that, in response to the existence of a budding 
competitive threat, a larger rival used its resources to purchase a 
critical upstream component to deny the plaintiff access and force it 
out of business—then the opportunities for private enforcement are, 
indeed, slim.181  
A competitor could challenge a merger by alleging that the post-
merger firm will facilitate collusion among rival firms that could 
retaliate against the plaintiff for choosing not to collude.182 This 
remains a viable theory under section 1. But a plaintiff alleging injury 
under a cartel retaliation theory faces its own challenges, including a 
line of cases adopting the theory that competitors actually benefit from 
higher degrees of market concentration and, therefore, do not suffer 
injuries sufficient for standing.183 Still, of the few private merger 
lawsuits that are actually brought, most are brought by competitors, 
and most rely on theories of single firm conduct.184 Thus, the post-
Cargill doctrinal narrowing of section 2 liability—which effectively 
prohibits private-merger lawsuits by competitors—is concerning. 
V.  REMOVE THE CARGILL BARRIER TO ENFORCEMENT 
The Court should overrule Cargill and reconsider the antitrust 
injury doctrine for private merger lawsuits. In Cargill, the majority 
failed to respond to Justice Stevens’ criticism of the majority’s focus on 
the post-merger behavior. Up until consummation, a merger 
represents the height of cooperative, or collusive, behavior. Horizontal 
mergers are, at their core, decisions to completely agree on prices, 
output, and market division, all of which are separately illegal under 
 
 181. Plaintiff’s Original Complaint at 4–11, SureShot Golf Ventures, Inc. v. Topgolf Int’l, Inc., 
2017 WL 3658948 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 24, 2017) (No. 4:17-cv-127). 
 182. See HOVENKAMP (5th ed. 2016), supra note 12, at 672 (describing requirements for a 
“collusion-facilitating” challenge to a merger); see also Brodley, supra note 38, at 51–52 
(describing the “cartel punishment” theory of competitor antitrust injury).  
 183. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 583 (1986) 
(“[As defendants’] competitors, respondents stand to gain from any conspiracy to raise the 
market price.”); Sprint Nextel Corp. v. AT&T Inc., 821 F. Supp. 2d 308, 319–20 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(denying standing because an increase in market concentration was presumed to benefit the 
competitor-plaintiff). 
 184. See HOVENKAMP (5th ed. 2016), supra note 12, at 671 (“Nevertheless, in the relatively 
small number of merger cases brought by private plaintiffs, the underlying rationale is most often 
exclusionary practices such as predatory pricing.”). 
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section 1 of the Sherman Act.185 So why focus totally on the post-
merger conduct?  
If market concentration in the U.S. is reaching dangerous levels,186 
the goal should be to review the competitive merits of a given merger 
and not be overly concerned with procedural technicalities. Having 
identified the problem posed by the interaction of the antitrust injury 
doctrine and section 2, it is time to begin thinking about a way forward. 
A few possibilities are contemplated below. 
One way to review the merits of more mergers is to resurrect 
Justice Stevens’ dissent in Cargill. Recall that his approach asks the 
reviewing court to do a first pass of the merger itself.187 Under such an 
approach, if there is a “reasonable probability” that competition will 
be injured by the merger, then “there is a reasonable probability that a 
competitor of the merging firms will suffer some corresponding harm 
in due course.”188 The specific harm resulting from the merger could be 
conceptualized as the loss of the opportunity to compete with one’s 
rivals in a competitive marketplace. Alternatively, if a merger causes a 
rival firm to adjust its business operations to account for a new firm, 
the concrete harm to the rival could be the change in operations that 
the merger induced. In the context of vertical mergers, like in SureShot, 
another option is to create an exception to the no-duty-to-deal rule for 
circumstances in which the rival gained its anticompetitive advantage 
through an illegal merger. Because it is axiomatic that possession of 
monopoly power is permissible when gained “as a consequence of a 
superior product, business acumen, or historic accident,”189 then 
monopoly power achieved or maintained through a competition-
destroying vertical merger falls outside of those categories and 
warrants a specific exception to the general no-duty-to-deal rule.  
In suggesting that the Court overturn a thirty-year-old precedent, 
it is necessary to address the question of stare decisis. Although cases 
should not be overruled simply because they were wrongly decided, 
this case presents an ideal candidate for reconsideration. The 
considerations for overruling prior decisions, according to Planned 
 
 185. Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49 (1990); Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Bd. 
of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 
U.S. 392, 398 (1927). 
 186. See supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text. 
 187. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 128–29 (1986) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
 188. Id. 
 189. Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) 
(quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966)).  
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Parenthood v. Casey,190 are: (1) whether there has been a dramatic 
change in factual circumstances; (2) whether a development in “related 
principles of law” necessitates a change; (3) whether the previous rule 
has become unworkable; and (4) whether there has been widespread 
reliance on the old rule, such that a change would cause “special 
hardship.”191  
The factual realities of mergers and acquisitions have changed 
since Cargill.192 There is now an additional thirty years of empirical 
evidence suggesting that mergers should be treated more skeptically. 
The old Chicago School assumptions about efficiency returns have not 
been borne out in the data.193 In the past, a prevailing assumption 
motivating skepticism of merger challenges was the fear of chilling 
efficient integration. But empirical data indicates that those fears are 
overblown.194 Moreover, there is simply more market concentration in 
the United States than there was 1986, and the FTC and DOJ have 
more on their plates.195 These factual realities support revisiting 
Cargill. 
Part III discussed the doctrinal narrowing of section 2, which is a 
“related principle[] of law.”196 It is unclear whether, in the wake of 
Aspen Skiing, the Court in Cargill believed that section 2 jurisprudence 
would take a different path. Perhaps not. But regardless, section 2 has 
fundamentally changed in a way that has bearing on the Cargill 
framework for antitrust injury. This change provides support for 
revisiting the decision.  
Whether the Cargill framework has become practically 
unworkable depends on one’s view of the virtues of private lawsuits 
challenging potentially anticompetitive mergers. For those who are 
 
 190. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 191. Id. at 854–55. 
 192. See supra notes 16–21 and accompanying text. 
 193. See ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 406 
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distrustful of private attorneys general, there might not be a problem 
with the status quo. That said, the Clayton Act explicitly provides for 
private enforcement of the antitrust laws, including laws preventing 
illegal acquisitions.197 While the courts certainly can, and do, interpret 
statutes in ways that balance a host of atextual concerns, they are 
simply not authorized to read explicit provisions out of a statute’s 
text.198 Cargill’s focus on post-merger conduct has become practically 
unworkable because it creates an insurmountable standard for a 
private right of action that contemplates relief for “any” injured 
person.199  
It is difficult to imagine how reversing Cargill would result in 
exceptional hardship for any firm. Antitrust injury requirements are 
procedural hurdles for private plaintiffs to get into court. So, to the 
extent these rules influence firms’ primary conduct, they do so only as 
part of the calculus in assessing litigation risk associated with pursuing 
a merger. In this sense, traditional reliance interests are not implicated 
because firms have not conformed their behavior around any 
substantive rule. Moreover, if the new antitrust injury rule was to be 
applied retroactively to mergers already consummated, the remedy for 
any successful litigation would be damages. Courts are reluctant to 
undo a merger after the fact.200 
Finally, stare decisis applies with less force in antitrust.201 The 
Court has been willing to overturn antitrust decisions even if they are 
much older than Cargill in recognition that the economic assumptions 
underlying the previous decisions no longer hold up.202 Mergers should 
be no different, and thus Cargill should be overruled. 
 
 197. See supra text accompanying note 38. 
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CONCLUSION 
Since 1914, mergers and acquisitions that substantially lessen 
competition or “tend to create a monopoly” have been unlawful. In the 
face of increased market concentration, market power, and concerning 
evidence about the effects of mergers and acquisitions, it is time to find 
and remove obstacles to effective enforcement of these merger laws. 
One area that is ripe for reform is the antitrust injury doctrine for 
merger lawsuits established by the Cargill decision, and, more 
specifically, that decision’s interaction with section 2 of the Sherman 
Act.  
Instead of simply asking whether the merger itself is 
anticompetitive, the Cargill decision asks a plaintiff to allege that the 
post-merger firm will itself act anticompetitively in a way that injures 
the plaintiff. To demonstrate this injury, plaintiffs must rely on 
accepted theories of antitrust liability. And because the additional 
theory of liability is aimed at the conduct of the new entity, plaintiffs 
will often assert a theory of anticompetitive behavior under section 2. 
However, in the time since Cargill was decided, the Court has 
dramatically narrowed the scope of liability under section 2. This 
narrowing has had the collateral effect of prohibiting competitor-
plaintiffs from being able to demonstrate an antitrust injury to 
challenge a merger. In light of this doctrinal narrowing of section 2, 
Cargill should be overruled. 
